Restrictions against Russia’s “shadow” fleet have proven quite effective. Frequent detentions of vessels and the risk of secondary sanctions against countries that provided their registration played a key role. This forced these jurisdictions to begin revoking the registration of tankers involved in the transportation of sanctioned Russian oil. As a result, Russia faced a serious threat to the functioning of its shadow fleet and the potential loss of a significant portion of its revenues. Consequently, the Kremlin abandoned “grey” and semi-legal offshore schemes and began re-registering tankers under its own state flag.
For a long time, in order to conceal real owners, circumvent the price cap, and avoid Western sanctions, Russia transported oil using tankers sailing under the flags of poor African and island nations. The operators of Russia’s “shadow” fleet most frequently used the registries of countries such as Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Cameroon, Belize, and others. This scheme allowed tankers to freely enter international ports, gain access to logistical infrastructure, and obtain Western insurance. However, under increased pressure from the United States and the EU, and fearing secondary sanctions, these jurisdictions began mass cancellation of registrations for sanctioned vessels. This ultimately forced Russia to launch a large-scale re-registration of its ships under its own flag.
Facing the threat of a significant reduction in oil exports, the Kremlin began re-registering tankers through its national maritime register. Between July 2025 and March 2026, according to Lloyd’s List, more than 40 large vessels received Russian registration. In many cases, the flag change occurred directly during voyages in international waters, without basic technical inspections or adherence to formal procedures.
According to data from the KSE Institute, while in May 2025 the share of shadow fleet vessels under the Russian flag accounted for only 3% of total oil shipments, by spring 2026 this figure had risen to 23%. The trigger for this hasty “nationalization” of shipping was intensified Western pressure. For example, in July 2026 alone, Cameroon revoked the registration of 39 suspicious tankers that had been illegally using its flag.
Russian re-registration does not make the tankers untouchable. It does not cancel existing sanctions, does not guarantee access to Western ports, and does not protect against possible detention in territorial or international waters. However, it can increase the political cost of any detention by a military vessel and gives Russia grounds to claim an act of aggression, which it can use as a pretext for escalation or a military provocation.
Thus, transferring shadow fleet vessels to the Russian flag is an attempt to ensure uninterrupted exports of Urals crude oil to China, India, and other countries of the Global South. For the Kremlin, this is also a matter of regime survival, as analysts estimate these shipments are expected to bring the Russian budget up to $183 billion in the second half of 2026 alone.
Today, Russia is effectively building a parallel maritime legal system to replace Western registrars. The Kremlin uses its own maritime register (which is under sanctions) to issue technical certificates to vessels without conducting proper inspections.
Notably, the Russian Maritime Register has legalized the issuance of documents for sanctioned tankers without the mandatory dry-dock inspection required by international maritime law. Certificates of seaworthiness are issued based on so-called “remote surveys” using only photos and videos, which violates the requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In this way, Russia has already added more than 40 Aframax and Suezmax tankers over 18–20 years old to its register — a critical threshold after which international regulators usually require decommissioning or major overhaul.
All associated risks are covered, with the support of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, by Russian state insurance companies such as Sogaz and AlfaStrakhovanie. The financial legitimacy of these operations is ensured by the Russian National Reinsurance Company (RNRC), a subsidiary of the Central Bank. To compensate for the lack of access to the International Group of P&I Clubs, in 2026 the Central Bank increased RNRC’s declared capital to 750 billion rubles, thereby guaranteeing coverage of potential environmental, property, and other risks.
According to the KSE Institute’s June report, this scheme has enabled the creation of a fully autonomous insurance system. Marine Traffic data for spring 2026 confirmed that at least 30 shadow fleet tankers loaded with Urals crude in Russian ports passed through the Danish Straits and the Bosphorus. All vessels were officially insured by Sogaz and AlfaStrakhovanie. From the perspective of international law and environmental threats, this creates certain risks, as coastal countries are forced to allow these vessels passage despite the lack of guarantees from Russia that it will pay billions in compensation in the event of an oil spill.
In summary, by hastily nationalizing the shadow fleet, the Kremlin is trying to solve three strategic objectives. First, to save oil revenues for continued financing of the war against Ukraine. Second, Moscow is eliminating dependence on foreign intermediaries and offshore shell companies by bringing captains and vessels under its direct control. Third, this represents military-political blackmail: by hiding behind the rights of a state flag under the UN Convention, the Kremlin effectively turns every tanker into its sovereign territory. This significantly raises the political price of any detention by European naval forces and gives Russia grounds to claim aggression at sea.
All of this indicates that the Russian Federation is preparing for a long game and has no intention of stopping illegal oil exports. Its confrontation with the West will be prolonged and drawn-out.
