The autumn 2026 election cycle gives Russia an opportunity to influence political processes in several EU countries at once — Germany, Sweden, Latvia and Bulgaria. The Kremlin has long used information-psychological operations to affect elections. Its core goal remains unchanged: to shape a favorable information environment for loyal politicians and pro-Russian parties, and to steer public opinion in a direction that benefits Moscow.
The main tools of influence are clones of foreign media outlets, bot networks, the spread of planted stories and propaganda on social media, and loyal local opinion leaders or “agents of influence.” The key propaganda narratives remain anti-European and anti-NATO rhetoric, migration, calls to end support for Ukraine, and targeted discrediting of politicians inconvenient to the Kremlin.
Sweden occupies a special place on this list because it has no obvious pro-Russian politicians the Kremlin could rely on in the general election on 13 September 2026. Information operations therefore focus on discrediting the incumbent government, stoking anti-European and anti-migrant sentiment, and attempts to obtain insider information. In August 2026, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) exposed and neutralized an information-espionage operation run by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Russian handlers recruited an employee of a third-country diplomatic mission to collect confidential data on Sweden’s political decisions, relations with partners, military aid to Ukraine, and defense capabilities. Thanks to the timely detection of the operation, Swedish counterintelligence was able to stop further use of this person by Russian special services.
On 19 August, Swedish broadcaster SVT reported the discovery of seven fabricated videos posted on X within about an hour. The materials were disguised as content from SVT, Dagens Nyheter, Euronews and Der Spiegel and pushed claims of alleged fraud or manipulation in the Swedish elections, government corruption, and the harm of supporting Ukraine. They also exploited distrust of NATO and the West, “Islamization,” and migration. Analysts suggest the campaign may be a continuation of the well-known “Matryoshka” operation, which involves multi-layered dissemination of disinformation and planted stories masked as material from reputable media.
In Latvia, ahead of the parliamentary elections on 3 October 2026, the risk of Russian interference is recognized at the highest level. In July, Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs warned of possible attempts by Moscow to influence the vote, and the State Security Service (VDD) lists Russian information-psychological operations among the country’s key risks. In August it also intensified cases linked to pro-Russian activity, including the promotion of separatist ideas in Daugavpils and systematic justification of Russian aggression — evidence of a local environment suited to spreading such narratives. One of Latvia’s main vulnerabilities remains part of the Russian-speaking population oriented toward the Russian information space. According to Latvian special services, the Kremlin combines cyberattacks with massive disinformation, exploiting language conflicts, the rights of Russian speakers, and sociocultural debates. At the same time, Moscow seeks to discredit the pro-Western coalition and undermine trust in electoral procedures in order to weaken support for Ukraine and create more favorable conditions for populist and Russophile forces in the future Saeima.
In Bulgaria the mechanism of Russian influence is somewhat different, because Russian narratives are largely spread through local websites and social media. A DFRLab study of campaigns around the spring 2026 parliamentary elections found networks promoting claims of alleged EU interference in Bulgarian politics. Among local outlets that systematically relayed pro-Russian narratives were Pogled Info, Glasove and Epicenter.bg. According to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, more than 70% of the content on some pro-Russian Bulgarian resources consists of reprints, translations or adaptations of material from sanctioned Russian state media. Against the backdrop of the presidential election on 25 October 2026, the main circulating narratives concern criticism of sanctions against Russia, alleged negative economic consequences for Bulgaria of the EU’s confrontation with Russia, aid to Ukraine, and relations with NATO. In 2026 Sofia publicly stressed that sanctions against Russia should not inflict significant damage on EU economies.
The clearest link between Russian disinformation and a concrete domestic political payoff is visible in Germany. According to Reuters sources in German security services, Russian disinformation campaigns ahead of the September 2026 state elections aim to discredit the CDU, SPD, Greens and FDP and often target AfD’s local competitors, creating a more favorable information environment for that party.
Kremlin disinformation campaigns and bot networks, including Operation Matryoshka, systematically attack AfD’s opponents with fabricated kompromat and fakes. The main goal of such campaigns is to intensify discontent over support for Ukraine and the government’s migration and energy policies, undermine trust in Germany’s democratic institutions, and create additional conditions for strengthening AfD and BSW in the state parliaments. Both political forces oppose further support for Ukraine and Berlin’s sanctions policy.
The autumn elections in Sweden, Latvia, Bulgaria and Germany show a shift in Russia’s approach to interfering in electoral processes: instead of direct pro-Russian agitation, Moscow increasingly exploits existing weaknesses and contradictions in European societies. The ultimate aim of such operations is not only to help a particular party win, but also to weaken trust in democratic institutions, deepen internal polarization, and shape a political environment in the EU that is less willing to support Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and NATO’s common policy.
