The night launch of the Soyuz-MS-28 carrier rocket from Baikonur on the night of November 28 ended with the successful arrival of three crew members at the ISS but turned into an unexpected crisis for the Russian space industry. During the launch, elements of the launch complex at pad 31/6 were damaged. The mobile service cabin and associated structures fell into the fire trench and were seriously damaged. Roscosmos officially confirmed the damage and announced that repairs would be carried out soon, but video footage from a drone and analysis of the incident paint a much more serious picture than the official statements suggest.
Technically, the incident is simple in terms of mechanics, but complex in terms of consequences. Pad 31/6 is considered the only certified Russian launch site at Baikonur for manned launches of Soyuz-type carrier rockets. This means that the loss of key service equipment directly affects Russia’s ability to regularly send people into space. In the near future, flight plans, contractual obligations, and operational reserves may be at risk of disruption due to the destroyed ground infrastructure.
The political and image impact of what happened goes far beyond the engineering problem. For Russia, a country that has repeatedly emphasized its “membership in the elite club” of manned programs, the vulnerability of its infrastructure and dependence on a single working launch vehicle has become painful bad publicity. After all, ISS project partners and commercial customers pay attention not only to the ability to produce one or two successful launches, but also to guarantees of regularity, the availability of backup sites, and supply chains. Infrastructure failure undermines confidence in Russia’s role as a reliable operator in the manned space sector and may force partners to accelerate diversification—from increasing the share of American/commercial launches to seeking alternatives in Asia and Europe.
At the same time, the main obstacle to restoring the launch complex will be not so much the technical component as logistics and economics. Modern launch infrastructure elements include complex electronics that are heavily dependent on international supplies. Sanctions imposed on Russia after 2022 have restricted access to a number of high-tech components and made import substitution more difficult. Suppliers in China and other countries often demand compensation for risk and logistics, and delivery times have also increased. Even with the availability of “spare parts” claimed by the official side, their compatibility, suitability, and regulatory acceptance becomes a separate and non-trivial project.
Against the backdrop of these economic constraints, experts are considering various scenarios for how the situation might unfold. The first is optimistic: rapid local repairs within a few weeks, thanks to stocks of the necessary materials and the mobilization of specialized enterprises. The second scenario is pessimistic, suggesting that it will take months or even years if alternative components need to be manufactured or certified. Logistical delays and financial difficulties in paying for and insuring transit through third countries are also possible. In the worst-case scenario, a prolonged suspension of manned launches will not only undermine Russia’s image, but also halt commercial contracts and reduce the technological potential of the industry due to the outflow of specialists and delays in production.
Within Russia, the incident will undoubtedly intensify criticism of the industry’s management and once again raise the question of the legacy of the Soviet space infrastructure: why does the “great space power” not have the necessary reserves and alternative sites? Why is the modernization/construction of launch complexes proceeding at a bureaucratic pace rather than under an accelerated program? For a society accustomed to viewing space exploration as a source of national pride, such a crisis will undermine confidence in government statements about technological sovereignty and leadership in the space industry. On the international stage, the incident exacerbates strategic rivalry. Partners will inevitably ask themselves how safe and profitable it is to keep key elements of joint projects on Russian infrastructure.
Given the sanctions and international isolation of Russia, the economic aspect is of paramount importance. Restoring the launch equipment will require significant financial resources, but the Russian budget and relevant corporations are currently prioritizing military and geopolitical expenditures, and large investments in “export-oriented” space infrastructure may be “postponed” indefinitely. At the same time, attempts to accelerate the recreation of components will face objective limitations: years of creating a competitive component base, training personnel, and obtaining certifications. Anti-Russian sanctions have made technology imports more expensive and less predictable, which means either costly adaptation and increased project costs or delays.
Finally, the incident raises questions about the future development of Russian space exploration, as it will become more difficult to maintain the provision of “fast and cheap” manned services in the foreseeable future unless reforms are undertaken to ensure infrastructure sustainability, management transparency, and logistics diversification. This means not only repairing a specific launch complex but also implementing a comprehensive strategy to invest in alternative launch sites (including Vostochny), developing the element base, and restructuring contractual relationships with partners to reduce dependence on incidents. Obviously, such a course requires time, large investments, and resources, which the Russian regime is currently forced to allocate among a multitude of priorities.
The incident that occurred at Baikonur appears to be not only a technical failure, but also a reflection of Russia’s external constraints and internal weaknesses: political, economic, and managerial.