Since the early 2010s, the geopolitical rivalry between the two major powers, the US and China, has gone far beyond bilateral relations. This struggle, which includes trade wars, technological competition, and ideological conflicts, is shaping new rules for global politics and economics, which has become particularly noticeable in the outgoing year of 2025. Europe, once confidently standing at the center of the Western world, now finds itself caught between two fires and forced to balance between its alliance with Washington and Beijing’s growing economic influence.
Today, the US sees China as its main strategic competitor in all key areas, from technology to military power and influence in international institutions. This competition has gone beyond trade tariffs and become part of a strategy to exert influence. Beijing, in turn, is not simply responding with mirror economic measures, but is building its own levers of influence through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and investments in the infrastructure of numerous countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
In such an environment, Europe faces a fundamental dilemma. Against the backdrop of escalating US-China competition, the EU must decide whether to strengthen its strategic unity with the US or to seek an independent position capable of protecting its own interests.
The trade dispute between the US and China has already led to a significant restructuring of global supply chains. US tariffs and export restrictions are forcing China to seek new markets and deepen economic ties with other regions, including Europe. This creates both opportunities and threats for European businesses. For example, Germany and other EU countries depend on Chinese markets in sectors such as automotive and electronics. At the same time, protectionist measures by the US against China are leading to higher transit costs and fragmentation of supplies, which is negatively affecting the export and import operations of European companies.
This redistribution of economic flows has a dual impact. On the one hand, European companies gain access to Chinese markets, but on the other, they face the risk of economic blackmail and dependence on Chinese demand. China, meanwhile, is actively investing in infrastructure and businesses abroad in an attempt to secure a strong position in European markets.
The political situation is further complicated by the fact that Europe finds itself involved in a conflict that it did not initiate. Disagreements are growing within the EU, as some countries advocate a tough stance toward China, relying on their strategic partnership with the US, while others see Beijing as an important economic partner and a potential counterweight.
American expectations of mutual support on security, technology, and sanctions policy put Europe in a difficult position. After the start of the conflict in Ukraine, the role of the US in European security once again became a leading factor, but at the same time, the desire for strategic autonomy, i.e., the ability to act independently of Washington’s influence, has also grown.
This desire is evident in the EU’s attempts to develop its own approaches to Chinese influence, including restrictions on certain types of investment and regulation of Chinese economic expansion, as well as in discussions about creating European technological standards that could compete with American and Chinese ones.
The technology sector has become one of the central arenas of global competition. The US and China are engaged in a fierce battle for leadership in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and key digital platforms. Europe, with its fragmented technology sector and relatively low level of investment in fundamental research, risks falling behind if it does not develop its own innovation strategy.
The US also dominates the market capitalization of leading technology companies, while Europe often lags behind in key segments. This creates additional geopolitical pressure, as technological dependence means strategic vulnerability, i.e., the possibility of external influence on critical infrastructure and decisions. If Europe does not strengthen its scientific and technological capabilities, it risks remaining an economically secondary player in a world where the US and China will determine the rules of the digital economy.
The rivalry between the great powers inevitably affects public sentiment within EU countries. Increased competition between the US and China leads to greater information pressure, disinformation, and political fragmentation. China is conducting influence campaigns in the media and political circles, seeking to create favorable conditions for itself and weaken EU unity.
At the same time, internal political divisions within the EU are intensifying under the pressure of economic crises, inflation, and unresolved structural problems. Political forces on both the right and left are playing on growing feelings of distrust toward old alliances, which creates fertile ground for populist movements and deepens divisions within European society.
Today, Europe finds itself in a difficult situation. The confrontation between the US and China is no longer an external factor and is increasingly permeating European politics, economics, and public sentiment. At the same time, a trend that the EU preferred not to mention aloud just a few years ago is becoming increasingly apparent: the gradual “withdrawal” of the US from Europe as a priority strategic direction.
This trend is reflected in several dimensions. The new US national security strategy explicitly shifts the focus of American foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific region and rivalry with China, while Europe is increasingly seen as a region capable of bearing a greater share of responsibility for its own security. At the same time, Donald Trump’s harsh and public statements directed at European politicians, including accusations of “free riding” in the field of defense and economic parasitism, reinforce the feeling that the transatlantic partnership is losing its former unconditional character.
In these circumstances, Europe faces at least two problems. On the one hand, the weakening of American strategic attention means increased security risks and a reduction in the political guarantees on which the EU has relied for decades. On the other hand, the intensifying rivalry between the US and China leaves Europe with less and less room for maneuver, forcing it to either follow Washington or seek its own, more autonomous model of behavior, at the risk of economic losses and internal divisions.
If the EU fails to develop a comprehensive strategy in the areas of defense, technology, industrial policy, and external relations, it risks becoming not an independent player, but an object of geopolitical influence for the two superpowers. On the contrary, awareness of the fact that the US is gradually withdrawing from the European agenda may stimulate Europe to tackle the task of truly strengthening its strategic autonomy, without which talk of the EU’s sovereignty and global role will remain nothing more than declarations.
In this sense, the confrontation between the US and China appears not so much as an external conflict, but rather as a mirror in which Europe can see its own vulnerability and the incompleteness of its political project with increasing clarity. The question here is whether Europe will be able to defend itself in a world where the old guarantees no longer work.