Under British leadership, ten Northern European and Baltic nations are establishing new combined naval forces based on the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), aimed at countering Russian threats in strategically important northern waters. The new alliance will include the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, with Canada also planned as a strategic partner for select Arctic operations.
The alliance’s formation is driven by growing hybrid threats from Russia at sea. Over the past three years, the number of Russian vessel incursions into the region’s territorial waters for espionage or malicious purposes has increased by nearly a third, reinforcing London’s awareness that traditional NATO structures are too cumbersome to counter “hybrid” maritime threats. The situation is further complicated by Russia’s brazen behaviour at sea — it has begun using warships to escort its “shadow fleet” and continues provocations and suspicious intelligence-gathering and subversive activity near underwater communications infrastructure.
Built on the JEF framework, the alliance’s tasks will range from round-the-clock monitoring of underwater infrastructure and internet cable systems to forceful deterrence of Russian hybrid aggression at sea. Faced with a shortage of its own warships, Britain intends to transform this coalition into a high-tech network where the combined intelligence of ten nations and swarms of maritime drones will create an “impenetrable shield” from the Baltic to the Arctic. The UK is already testing new unmanned surface vessels capable of conducting patrols and reconnaissance — tasked, among other things, with escorting Russian ships through the English Channel, freeing up destroyers for more complex missions. Britain is also investing in the development of a large Extra-Large Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) capable of remaining submerged for weeks, guarding underwater communications and detecting sabotage devices. All of this will help offset Russia’s numerical advantage in large surface vessels through technological and more mobile superiority among Britain’s allies.
The urgency of forming this alliance stems from a convergence of factors. On one hand, the unpredictability of the Trump administration in Washington has led London to recognise that Northern European security is no longer a US priority, as America has turned its focus inward and toward the rivalry with China. On the other hand, Russia has radically shifted its tactics — moving from mere threatening rhetoric to actively testing British “red lines.” Suspicious and dangerous manoeuvres near transatlantic communications cables, and the demonstrative passage of sanctioned tankers through the English Channel, have become increasingly frequent occurrences.
In the North Sea and Baltic, Russian activity has evolved into a form of “hybrid siege” aimed at creating the conditions to undermine Europe’s energy and communications independence. Russian “research” vessels and warships have repeatedly been spotted in the immediate vicinity of underwater cables and strategic pipelines, such as the Balticconnector, whose damage in 2023 exposed the critical vulnerability of the entire regional network.
In the Baltic Sea, the situation is further aggravated by Russia’s frequent GPS signal jamming — endangering civilian shipping and air traffic — as well as the active use of underwater vehicles to locate the communications cables linking Estonia, Finland, and Sweden. Military and political leaders in the Baltic states and Britain interpret these actions as Russia mapping vulnerabilities in underwater infrastructure, potentially for use in large-scale sabotage operations capable of paralysing the energy systems and digital communications of the entire region. Following several uninvestigated cable-damage incidents near the Svalbard archipelago in 2022 and a communications severance between Finland and Germany in the Baltic Sea, the threat of entire regions being physically cut off from the global network — or having classified data intercepted — has become a critical national security challenge for London and its partners.
The new naval alliance is precisely intended to prevent Russia from realising these ambitions. However, the implementation of this ambitious initiative faces several challenges, the most significant of which may be the evident gap between London’s geopolitical objectives and its actual technical capabilities. Many vessels of the Royal Navy are in need of major repair and modernisation, to say nothing of the need to strengthen and expand personnel capacity. Furthermore, the absence of US support within the system imposes certain limitations on satellite intelligence, while complex legal contradictions in international maritime law restrict the alliance’s ability to forcibly detain vessels of Russia’s shadow fleet in neutral waters. The Royal Navy currently faces the task of mastering the operational resolution of issues around ship repair, modernisation, and funding — otherwise the new coalition will remain merely an effective monitoring tool, capable only of recording Russian sabotage and intelligence activities but not preventing them, despite the project’s considerable potential. In any case, the unmanned fleet could prove to be a meaningful asset alongside the British destroyers with which it will serve.