Until recently, Russia’s presence in France was perceived largely as part of cultural exchange and economic cooperation. However, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and especially following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has increasingly been associated with destabilisation, covert pressure, and a threat to democratic institutions.
One of the most proven channels of Russian influence has been political contacts. Investigations by French journalists and parliamentary reports have shown that certain French parties and leaders received loans from Russian banks. The most notorious example was the multi-million euro loan obtained by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally from the First Czech-Russian Bank in 2014. This fact has been repeatedly debated in parliament and in the press, raising questions about the party’s political independence. Attention has also been drawn to statements by individual deputies who justified the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine and called for sanctions to be lifted. Such financial arrangements became levers of pressure and created risks of dependency. At the same time, rhetoric appeared in the public space that curiously coincided with the Kremlin’s interests—criticising the European Union, expressing scepticism toward NATO, and justifying Russian foreign policy.
The negative consequences of these contacts are evident. First, citizens’ trust in the independence of the national political system is undermined. Second, social divisions deepen, with part of the population beginning to see Russia as an “alternative ally.”
Officially, France supports sanctions against Russia. In practice, however, it remains linked to Russian energy resources. Liquefied natural gas continues to flow through French terminals, and national companies remain engaged in joint projects. This not only brings financial benefits to certain corporations but also creates political vulnerabilities for the state. In the context of an energy crisis, dependence on Russian gas carries serious risks, since Moscow has repeatedly used energy as an instrument of pressure on its partners. For France, maintaining such ties means a potential conflict between commercial interests and principles of national security.
Beyond energy, Russian capital has a visible presence in French real estate. The Côte d’Azur and Paris have become centres of concentration for luxury villas, apartments, and assets linked to Russian businessmen and political elites. In France, properties belonging to Kremlin-linked oligarchs such as Igor Sechin and Gennady Timchenko have been seized. Media attention has focused on the “Altamar” villa in Saint-Jean-Cap-Ferrat, associated with the family of Arkady Rotenberg. In Paris, investigations targeted elite apartments registered to offshore companies controlled by Russian businessmen. Some of these properties have already been seized or are under investigation for money laundering. French authorities stress that such assets represent not only symbols of luxury but also instruments of hidden influence and sanction evasion. For French society, this means the growth of a shadow economy, pressure on the housing market, and the vulnerability of the financial system to inflows of dubious capital.
Alongside politics and economics, Russia has been active in the information space. The European External Action Service and France’s VIGINUM structure have documented numerous disinformation campaigns aimed at French audiences. Online “bots,” clone websites mimicking reputable media outlets, and fabricated news about crises and conflicts are widely used. The main goal is to undermine trust in the state and deepen social divides.
To this are added cyberattacks, which the French cybersecurity agency ANSSI links to groups acting in the interests of Russian intelligence. Targets have included state institutions, businesses, and even organisations involved in preparing the Olympic Games.
All these elements—loans to political parties, energy dependence, dubious capital flows, and cyberattacks—form a coherent picture of systemic pressure. Russia does not act through a single instrument; its strategy is multi-layered. Financial influence is reinforced by political support, while cyberattacks are accompanied by streams of disinformation.
The main negative effect of this presence is the erosion of trust. Citizens begin to doubt the transparency of the economy, the integrity of politicians, and the reliability of information. In a democratic society, such doubts corrode the foundations of stability and open the way to radicalisation and social conflict.
The French state has already taken measures—investigating dubious sources of party financing, imposing sanctions on individual oligarchs, freezing assets, and strengthening monitoring of disinformation flows. Yet these efforts remain insufficient. Reducing risks will require systemic steps: a complete renunciation of Russian LNG, stricter controls on foreign investment in real estate, maximum transparency in party financing, and a comprehensive strategy against disinformation and cyber threats. Only in this way can France protect its democracy and sovereignty.
Russia remains an active player on French soil—but not as an equal partner, rather as a source of threats and challenges. The Kremlin seeks to weaken France’s position within the EU and NATO, destabilise its domestic politics, and undermine public trust. The longer such influence persists, the higher the cost for the French state and society.