Corruption schemes in the field of railway state contracts in Poland reveal systemic problems that stretch from contractor selection to the padding of contracts with “necessary” components and the exaggeration of required volumes of work. When millions of złoty appear on tender papers, Poland’s “railway economy” often looks less like a tool of development and more like a well-oiled machine for redistributing state resources — but not necessarily in the taxpayers’ interest.
In recent years, large public railway tenders in Poland — covering modernization and supply of rolling stock, coal logistics, and even purchases of generators for humanitarian projects — have become fertile ground for corruption schemes: bribes, fictitious contractors, artificial inflation of project scope, and systemic kickbacks. The most recent case involves the president of FPS H. Cegielski, suspected by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) of accepting bribes connected to contracts for wagon modernization and supply for state operators (PKP InterCity and regional orders). This case only highlights a broader set of practices that year after year erode trust in railway procurement. Nor is it the first time large state railway contracts have been plagued by corruption risks: earlier cases involved PKP S.A. signing contracts with PR agencies founded by former employees, or awarding overpriced and redundant “preventive measures” contracts ahead of religious or youth events. While the Cegielski case is still under investigation, it underscores a pattern: large-scale state railway contracts act as magnets for corruption because of the vast sums involved, the complexity of logistics and technology, and the strong economic interests of contractors and high-ranking officials.
The main corruption triggers seen in the Cegielski affair and similar cases include: awarding contracts or subcontracts without genuine competition, or using opaque criteria that favor personal or political contacts. Closed or pseudo-competitive procedures often result in a “winner” that looks pre-selected, with technical specifications drafted for a single supplier, or “affiliate” firms created by former employees to mask ultimate beneficiaries. In the Cegielski case, investigators are examining possible irregularities in subcontractor selection. The use of state funds in large-scale contracts — wagon modernization or supply deals worth billions of złoty — provides ample room for abuse and overspending. Weak external oversight compounds the problem: poor needs assessments, opaque documentation, and the use of “options” that inflate costs after signing. Contractors and state entities alike enjoy wide latitude for manipulation.
Corruption mechanisms also activate at the implementation stage. These include financial “cushions” in the form of add-ons and options signed after the start of a contract, creating room for artificial price increases. Other schemes involve fictitious deliveries and invoices, sometimes linked to VAT fraud or sham subcontracts, which allow funds to be siphoned off beyond financial oversight. The CBA regularly uncovers such clusters — for example, operations last year that caused documented losses of tens of millions of złoty across several proceedings. But how many such cases go undetected, or perhaps are “overlooked” for other reasons?
An analysis of open investigations and law-enforcement findings over the past year highlights several “hot” categories: large infrastructure contracts (rolling stock modernization, track repairs, integrated projects), where huge sums and technical complexity create room for manipulation; logistics and transport services (coal transport contracts, freight routes), often accompanied by side compensations and off-the-books arrangements; supply of parts and materials, where deliveries can be broken down into countless small contracts or subcontracting chains (the area tied to the Cegielski allegations); and PR, consulting, and ancillary “services,” whose value is hard to verify and which often go to firms linked with current or former railway officials. The CBA has already documented cases where state railways awarded PR services to companies founded by ex-employees.
Anti-corruption experts also note the Russian footprint in corruption on Poland’s railways. This includes not only direct attempts by Russian companies or intermediaries to enter tenders through affiliated structures, but also the use of opaque logistics schemes tied to the supply of energy resources and coal, which until recently was imported from Russia or through “third countries.” Such contracts created channels for hidden financial flows, with funds siphoned into the pockets of middlemen and officials. Polish investigators have repeatedly found cases where companies registered in Central Europe but with real ties to Moscow or St. Petersburg sought to participate in railway materials and logistics tenders. This suggests that Russian influence on Poland’s railway sector is not merely economic but also political: through corruption, dependencies are created that undermine the strategic autonomy of Poland’s transport infrastructure.
Systemic violations in Poland’s transport sector have also drawn the attention of European institutions. Poorly organized or deliberately falsified tenders involving state agencies have become conduits for the leakage of European funds. These findings confirm that corruption risks in railway and related state contracts have a direct budgetary impact and extend well beyond “local” scandals.
Experts note that calculating the exact scale of losses is difficult: sometimes tens of millions of złoty in a single case, sometimes a combination of direct budget losses and indirect costs, such as project delays and rising maintenance expenses.
Cases like H. Cegielski’s are not anomalies but symptoms: state contracts with large budgets and complex technical demands inevitably create opportunities for corruption. A system where tender conditions can be tailored to a specific bidder, where contractors vanish into chains of subcontracts, and where audits drag on for years is the ideal breeding ground for hidden deals — not to mention destructive Russian influence that threatens national security. Investigations by the CBA and European agencies illustrate the scale of the problem, but the very number of cases in recent years suggests one thing clearly: without radical reform of procurement procedures, greater transparency of contract specifications, and independent auditing, corruption will continue to “feed” on state contracts in Poland’s railway sector.