After losing power in the October 2023 parliamentary elections and suffering further drops in approval ratings, Poland’s conservative party Law and Justice (PiS) entered a deep internal crisis that, by the summer of 2026, erupted into an open confrontation between its rival influence groups and took on the characteristics of a full-scale split. The party’s situation was further burdened by the loss of administrative resources and funding, which its leader Jarosław Kaczyński was even forced to acknowledge publicly. As a result, to preserve the remnants of its political influence and to mobilize its electorate, the party has tried to actively exploit the “Ukrainian question,” which, however, is unlikely to help it recover from its steep decline.
The main disputes are currently between the party leader Jarosław Kaczyński’s traditional wing and the faction of more moderate technocrats associated with former Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki. This split had long been brewing and reflects certain ideological differences and a generational conflict. As a result of Kaczyński’s authoritarian management methods, which include strict hierarchy and tight centralization of decision-making, competing influence groups began to quarrel over who to blame for the election defeat and who has the right to determine the party’s future direction. While the old party core seeks to preserve the status quo and loyalty to Kaczyński, its younger members and more pragmatic groups realize that without reforms and a change of leadership PiS is doomed to further decline.
The internal confrontation intensified after Morawiecki created the civic association “Rozwój Plus” (“Development Plus”), which, despite presenting itself formally as a platform for programmatic discussions, in reality aims to attract part of the centrist electorate and effectively serves as the basis for a new political project. To date, around 40 parliamentarians (Sejm deputies, senators and MEPs) have joined “Development Plus,” as well as dozens of local government officials.
Two opposing strategies for the party’s development divide Kaczyński’s old guard and Morawiecki’s technocrats. The leader’s group sees the future in maintaining rigid centralized control and further ideological radicalization. Meanwhile Morawiecki’s faction, through its platform, seeks to modernize and “rejuvenate” the party structure, proposing decentralization of management and a more pragmatic, center-right course to attract more moderate urban voters. For the record, PiS’s core supporters remain residents of villages and small towns.
Against the backdrop of the internal split, the party has felt an increased need to find an external enemy and to ramp up revanchist rhetoric, and PiS decided to use contentious events from the historical past related to Ukraine as a pretext — namely the Volhynia tragedy and the fact that one of Ukraine’s elite special operations units was named after heroes of its liberation movement. Thus, exploiting this issue became a tool for retaining and mobilizing its electorate.
Trying to preempt Morawiecki’s initiative, the PiS old guard began deliberately to develop anti‑Ukrainian rhetoric, whose main mouthpiece is PiS deputy chairman Przemysław Czarnek. In early July 2026, on the occasion of another anniversary of the Volhynia tragedy, he announced that he would submit a resolution to the Sejm calling to block Ukraine’s EU integration until historical issues are resolved.
On 11 July 2026 Czarnek made an emotional statement about the “moral duty to shout to all European capitals to stop the revival of Nazi ideology in Ukraine” and called to pressure the EU and NATO to “pause funding of weapons and reconstruction for Ukraine.” The statement provoked negative reactions in the Polish government and media, and later, under pressure of criticism, the politician was forced to clarify that he nevertheless supports Ukraine’s victory in the war with Russia, but solely on grounds of Polish national security. In this way historical issues became a means to raise his own neglected ratings and to trap Morawiecki: any attempt by him or other politicians to defend a pro‑Ukrainian position would be portrayed by the rightists as “betrayal of Polish interests” and “softness.” The point is that Morawiecki defends the legacy of his government, which in 2022 transferred large volumes of military aid to Ukraine, framing that policy not as altruism but as cold calculation in Poland’s interests.
On 15 July 2026, on the Polsat News program Graffiti, the former prime minister said that it is vital for Poland’s security that Ukraine continue to defend itself.
The situation then escalated. On 16 July 2026 the Polish outlet Gazeta Wyborcza reported that the PiS presidium had issued an ultimatum to all party members to leave newly created organizations and blocs within seven days (by 23 July) under the threat of immediate expulsion. Morawiecki refused to disband his political project, saying he would not give in.
Internal problems are not the only threat to the party’s prospects. On the opposition front PiS faces a growing threat from the rising far‑right party Confederation (Konfederacja), which builds political capital on anti‑Ukrainian rhetoric and euroskepticism — and whose members’ ties to Russia and its security services have repeatedly been the subject of discussion and concern not only within the Polish government but also among European institutions. To prevent part of its electorate from switching sides to competitors, PiS’s radical wing simply began echoing their rhetoric. That tactic has become a trap: by copying outsiders’ slogans instead of forming a strong, more competitive center‑right alternative, Kaczyński’s party marginalizes itself, loses the support of more moderate voters, and becomes dependent on the agenda and narratives of its ultra‑right opponents.
The leadership’s attempt to regain lost ground through ideological radicalization and pandering to anti‑Ukrainian rhetoric is a strategic mistake that cuts the party off from moderate centrist voters. Rather than a triumphant return to power, such tactics push PiS into deep isolation and deprive it of chances to build a future coalition, making it a hostage of the xenophobic and overtly pro‑Russian Confederation. Ultimately, this radicalization accelerates the internal split within the party and creates real threats to Poland’s national security by weakening its authority in the EU and NATO and making it a likely target for hybrid—primarily informational—interference from Russia.